The Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

What's the deal?

The deal is that Ethiopia has been wanting to build a dam for a long time but couldn't until recently. This dam could pose a threat to Egypt by reducing its share of Nile water and the electricity generated by the High Dam. That's the gist of it. Let's start from the beginning for those who don't know the story:

The Nile River has two main tributaries: the White Nile, which comes from the Great Lakes region in central Africa, from Uganda and Tanzania. Egypt doesn't benefit much from it because it loses water through evaporation and diversion. Then there's the Blue Nile, which comes from Ethiopia. Egypt benefits from it to the tune of about 86% of its share of the Nile water. The White and Blue Nile merge at Khartoum in Sudan, then split again in Damietta and Rosetta in Egypt. Got it?

Since the British occupation era in 1902, Egypt had an agreement stating that no projects should be carried out in Africa on the Nile to avoid harming Egypt's share. Despite that, the matter intensified with subsequent agreements in 1906 and 1929, which defined Egypt's share in the Nile as 92.3% and ensured non-interference. The last agreement granted Egypt veto power over any projects on the Nile's tributaries.

Ethiopia, despite having the Nile, sometimes faces droughts and famines because it lacks water storage like Lake Nasser in Egypt. And it doesn't rain all year round there. So, in 1956, they came up with the idea of building a dam on the Blue Nile to store water and generate electricity, seeking American help. In 1964, the US identified the most suitable location for the dam.

Negotiations were attempted by several Nile Basin countries, including an initiative in 1999 for joint projects on the Nile. Egypt adamantly refused, leveraging its veto power. Ethiopia, however, proceeded with its plans, facing issues due to internal conflicts and changing governments. In 2009, they conducted a geographical survey and made designs for the dam.

In 2010, Ethiopia made agreements with other African countries without Egypt and Sudan. Egypt, feeling threatened, made a deal with Sudan to protect their interests in the dam. President Mubarak had previously threatened to destroy the dam if built, especially after an assassination attempt in Addis Ababa in 1995. In late 2010, Egypt officially complained to the UN to halt the dam's financing and demanded Ethiopia's cooperation.

In 2011, Ethiopia offered Sudan a partnership in dam ownership. It's unclear how far this proposal went, but given Sudan's recent stances supporting Ethiopia, it seems promising. Then-President Morsi visited the dam but couldn't reach an agreement. Instead, he met with Sudan's Omar al-Bashir, affirming cooperation.

In May 2013, Ethiopia announced the start of dam construction, aiming to finish by 2017. Later, a leaked meeting in Egypt discussed attacking the dam or supporting Ethiopian opposition groups. This outraged Ethiopia and caused Sudan's stance to weaken, with al-Bashir dismissing the idea. Despite his government's alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Bashir feared supporting Ethiopian rebels against Sudan's main ally, Egypt. He even made a public statement in December 2013, highlighting the dam's benefits for Egypt and Sudan, without specifying them.

In January 2014, the Sisi government began negotiations with the Ethiopian side. In February, the Ministry of Irrigation issued a statement saying negotiations had failed, but thank God. Ethiopia responded with a statement rejecting Egypt's request to halt the dam, accusing Egypt of stalling negotiations. Egyptian Irrigation Minister later said negotiations were ongoing, ruling out any military solutions. However, an Ethiopian official responded, boasting that 32% of dam construction was complete and they could defend it militarily. The United Nations stated that Egypt hadn't requested the dam issue to be internationalized, meaning protection of its share wasn't guaranteed under international law.

In April 2014, Russia, China, the European Union, Italy, and the International Monetary Fund announced they would stop funding the dam, but construction continued. In June, Sisi met the Ethiopian Prime Minister to resolve the issue but failed. Talks and threats regarding dam construction and suspension persisted. However, Ethiopia's responses were always strong, as their threats were primarily military, whether from the Prime Minister or the Defense Minister.

Later, arbitration offices were set up to assess the dam's impact on Egypt and Sudan, one French and one Dutch. There are significant French interests with Ethiopia, so the French office said everything was fine and Egypt wouldn't be affected. However, the Dutch office warned Egypt would face water scarcity due to lack of cooperation from Ethiopia in providing necessary information.

In the past few months, Sisi signed an agreement with Ethiopia outlining ten principles affirming Egypt's right to its water share and Ethiopia's commitment not to harm it. The best part was the principle of "goodwill" in the agreement. The state-owned newspaper Al-Ahram criticized the agreement legally but later revealed its contents, emphasizing Egypt's position. Since then, Egypt has warned any Ethiopian official that Egypt won't tolerate any trouble and they should stick to the agreement. However, the agreement didn't specify technical aspects ensuring Egypt's non-detriment.

The reservoir behind the dam, once operational, will take 63-74 billion cubic meters, equivalent to Egypt and Sudan's annual shares. This will affect Egypt once the dam operates throughout the year.

The dam's strength and potential to withhold significant water due to its height and width raise concerns. Experts downplay its capacity as it's primarily designed for electricity generation, not water storage.

Agriculture will suffer as Egypt's share decreases by 10-12 billion cubic meters.

If Egypt attacks the dam after its completion, the reservoir's water is enough to cause flooding in Egypt. Additionally, there are concerns about potential Israeli involvement in support of Ethiopia.

The water flow may affect the electricity generated by the High Dam.

A misleading report suggests the Renaissance Dam could destabilize the African continent, threatening the stability of the Arabian Peninsula, including Mecca and the Kaaba.

Currently, Egypt's regional influence is greatly diminished, as stated by Africans in general and Ethiopians in particular. This emboldens any country to build on the Nile after Ethiopia.